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Authentication provides the trust people need to engage 
in transactions. The advent of physical keys that are 
impossible to copy promises to revolutionize this field. 
Up to now, such keys have been verified by classical 
challenge-response protocols [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. These 
protocols are in general susceptible to digital emulation 
attacks, in which the adversary intercepts the challenge 
and sends the correct response without needing access 
to the physical key. Here we demonstrate Quantum-
Secure Authentication (“QSA”) of an unclonable 
physical key (a classical multiple-scattering medium) 
using weak coherent light pulses. The authentication 
process is inherently secure by virtue of quantum-
physical principles [9, 10, 11, 12]. QSA operates in the 
limit of a large number of channels, represented by the 
more than thousand degrees of freedom of an optical 
wavefront shaped by a spatial light modulator [13]. In 
contrast, the light pulse probing the key contains only 
few photons. Since the shape is unpredictable for an 
adversary,  the availability of very few photons 
compared to the number of channels makes it 
impossible for him to determine the shape; this provides 
unconditional security against digital emulation. 
 
Authentication is an important cornerstone of security. 
Authentication of persons can be based on "something that 
you know", e.g. digital keys, or "something that you have", 
e.g. physical objects such as classical keys or official 
documents. A drawback of digital keys is that their theft 
can go unnoticed, but also the copying of a traditional 
physical key can be done secretly. A Physical Unclonable 
Function (PUF) is a physical object that cannot feasibly be 
copied because its manufacture inherently contains a  large 
number of uncontrollable degrees of freedom [1, 3]. A PUF 
is a function in the sense that it reacts to a stimulus 
(“challenge”) by giving a response. After manufacture there 
is a one-time characterization of the PUF in which its 
challenge-response behavior is stored in a database. The 
PUF (from this point referred to as the "key") can later be 
authenticated by comparing its response behavior to the 
database, see Fig. 1a. 
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PUFs are used to prevent physical emulation of the key, 
i.e., making a sufficiently accurate clone or concocting a 
device that mimics its physical behavior. This is infeasible, 
though not theoretically impossible, given the properties of 
PUFs [1, 3]. See also the supplementary material. However, 
PUFs are in general still vulnerable to a class of attacks that 
we will refer to as digital emulation (Fig. 1b). Here the 
adversary has knowledge of the key’s properties either from 
physical inspection of the key or by access to the challenge-
response database. He intercepts challenges and is able to 
provide the correct responses by looking them up in his 
database. This is a highly relevant scenario as accessible 
databases are notoriously difficult to protect. So far the only 
defense against digital emulation is to deploy various 
sensors that try to detect if some form of spoofing is going 
on. This leads to an expensive arms race in which it is 
difficult to ascertain the level of security. 
 
In this paper we present Quantum-Secure Authentication 
(QSA) of optical keys, a scheme with highly desirable 
properties: QSA  
- uses a key that is infeasible to emulate physically. 
- is unconditionally secure against digital emulation 
attacks. 
 
Figure 1| The idea of Quantum-Secure Authentication (QSA): a, 
In classical authentication of an optical unclonable physical key, a 
challenge wavefront of sufficient complexity is sent to the key. 
The response wavefront is compared with those stored in a 
database (yellow pieces) to make a pass (green light) or fail (red 
light) decision. However, this verification can be spoofed by an 
emulation attack (b) in which the challenge wavefront is 
completely determined and the expected response is constructed 
by the adversary who knows the challenge-response behavior of 
the key. In Quantum-Secure Authentication (c) the challenge is a 
quantum state for which an emulation attack (d) fails because the 
adversary cannot actually determine the quantum state and hence 
any attempt to generate the correct response wavefront fails.  
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- does not depend on secrecy of any stored data. 
- does not depend on unproven mathematical assumptions. 
- is straightforward to implement with current technology. 
 
The use of quantum physics in QSA is inspired by quantum 
cryptography [9, 10, 14]. However, there are major 
differences. The aim of quantum cryptography is to 
generate a secret digital key known only to Alice and Bob, 
whereas QSA allows Alice to check if Bob possesses a 
unique physical object. Quantum cryptography requires the 
existence of an authenticated channel between Alice and 
Bob, typically based on a secret key that is shared before-
hand [15]. In contrast, QSA needs only publicly available 
information; there are no secrets. See the supplementary 
material for an overview of cryptographic primitives and 
their properties. 
 
Our implementation of QSA uses random scattering media 
as PUF [1, 16, 17]. The challenges are high-spatial-
dimension states of light [18, 19, 20] with only a few 
photons. The response is speckle-like and depends strongly 
on the challenge and the positions of the scatterers. Due to 
the noncloning theorem [21] it is impossible for an 
adversary to fully determine the challenge and therefore to 
construct the expected response (Fig. 1c-d). The verifier 
can, however, easily verify the presence of the encoded 
information with an appropriate basis transformation, 
authenticating the key. 
 
After its manufacture, the key is enrolled: the challenge-
response pairs are measured with as much light as needed. 
Each of our challenges is described by a 50×50 binary 
matrix. Each element corresponds to a phase of either 0 or 
π. A spatial light modulator (SLM1) is used to transform 
the incoming plane wavefront into the desired challenge 
wavefront. The challenge is sent to the key and the 
reflected field is recorded in a phase-sensitive way. The 
challenge along with the corresponding response is stored 
in a challenge-response database. In our current 
implementation this requires 20 kB of computer memory 
per challenge-response pair which corresponds to 50 MB 
for a fully characterized key.  
 
After enrolment, keys are authenticated using the setup 
illustrated in Fig. 2. Our light source is an attenuated laser 
beam chopped into 500 ns light pulses each containing n = 
230±40 photons. Quantum readout of optical keys can be 
achieved with single or bi-photon states [22], squeezed 
states [23] or other fragile quantum states [11]. We use 
coherent states of light with low mean photon number [24], 
because in QSA they provide a similar security as other 
quantum states and are easier to implement in real-life 
applications. A challenge-response pair is constructed using 
information from the database. SLM1 is used to shape the 
few-photon challenge wavefront, which is then sent to the 
key. The reflected wavefront is sent to SLM2, which adds 
to it the conjugate phase pattern of the expected response 
wavefront. Therefore, SLM2 transforms the reflected 
speckle field into a plane wave only when the response is 
correct. In case the response is wrong, SLM2 transforms 
the field into a completely different speckle field. When the 
response is correct, the lens positioned behind SLM2 
focuses the plane wave to a point in the analyser plane, as 
shown in Fig. 2b. A false key will result in a speckle on the 
analyser plane as shown in Fig. 2c. Compared to the typical 
peak height in Fig. 2b of 1000 times the background, the 
loss of intensity in the center of Fig. 2c is dramatic. We 
spatially filter the field in the analyser plane with a pinhole 
and image it onto a photon-counting detector. In Fig. 3a we 
show the typical photodetector signal for the correct 
response and for an incorrect response provided by the true 
and a false key, respectively. Only with the true key 
multiple photodetections are seen. After repeating the 
measurement 2000 times, Fig. 3b shows the histogram of 
the number of photodetections for the true key, resembling 
a Poissonian distribution with a mean of 4.3. Fig. 3b also 
shows the average histogram of photodetections when 5000 
random challenges are sent to the key, with the key and 
SLM2 kept unchanged. This experiment gives an upper 
bound on the photodetections in case of an attack with a 
random key. This histogram resembles a Poissonian 
distribution with a mean of 0.016 photodetections. We can 
clearly discriminate between true and false keys.  
 
Figure 2| Quantum-secure optical readout of a physical key. a, 
Setup: A spatial light modulator (SLM1) creates the challenge by 
phase shaping a few-photon wavefront. In the experiment a 50x50 
binary phase pattern is used with 0 and π phase delays. The 
challenge is sent to the ZnO key (scale bar is 4 µm) by a 
microscope objective (not shown). The response is coupled out by 
a polarising beam splitter (PBS). The response is transformed 
back by SLM2 and then focused onto the analyser plane. b, Only 
if the key is the true unique key, the response has a bright spot in 
the centre, holding ≈60% of the power in the image and allowing 
that fraction to pass a pinhole and land on a detector where 
photodetection clicks authenticate the key. c, In case of a false 
key, the response in the analyser plane is a random speckle 
pattern.  
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In order to characterize the 
achievable security for one repetition 
of our readout, we introduce the 
quantum security parameter S, 
S ≡ K/n,   (1) 
as the ratio of the number of 
controlled modes K and the average 
number of photons n in the 
challenge. The parameter K 
quantifies the dimensionality of the 
challenge space and is equal to the 
number of independent response 
wavefronts that are obtained by 
sending in different challenge 
wavefronts. It is well approximated 
by the number of speckles on the key 
illuminated by the challenge [25]. In 
our experiment we have K = 
1100±200 and n = 230±40, yielding 
S = 5±1. Because a measurement of a 
photon can extract only a limited 
amount of information, a large S 
implies that the adversary can only 
obtain a small fraction of the 
information required to characterize 
the challenge. Therefore he cannot 
determine the correct response. An 
adversary who measures an optimal 
choice of field quadratures of the challenge cannot achieve 
a fidelity better than approximately [26]  
F = FOK /(S+1),     (2) 
where F is the fraction of photons detected by the verifier’s 
hardware in case of an attack and FOK is the fraction of 
photons detected when the response is correct. This result 
holds for S > 1 and K >> 1 and is in line with the intuition 
that a measurement of n photons can only provide 
information about n modes. Operating the readout in the 
regime S > 1 therefore gives the verifier an eminent security 
advantage which has its origin in the quantum character of 
light.  
In the verification we aim to discriminate a correct key 
from an optimal attack. Given a conservative lower bound 
of S = 4, the number of photodetections on the single-
photon detector in a single readout in case of an optimal 
(digital emulation) attack follows a Poissonian distribution 
with mean 0.86, as shown in Fig. 3b. Choosing a threshold 
of 3 or more photodetections for accepting the key, we find 
that the measured false reject ratio is 9%. In case of random 
challenges the false accept ratio is 1.7×10-4 % and the 
theoretical maximum false accept probability in case of the 
digital emulation attack (Eq. 2) is 6% (Fig. 3c). The 
security improves exponentially by repeating the 
verification, every time choosing a different challenge and 
its corresponding SLM2 setting from the database. The 
individual photon counts are added, and a combined 
threshold is set. As illustrated in Fig. 3d, after 10 repetitions 
the false accept and false reject probabilities are of order 
10-4. As detailed in the supplementary information, after 20 
repetitions they are both of order 10-9. Thus, the false 
decision rates can be made negligible in a small number of 
repetitions. 
In our implementation, the time for readout is limited to 
about 100 ms by the switching time of the SLM. Using 
faster micromirror-based SLMs [27, 28], the complete 
authentication protocol with 20 repetitions can be 
performed in less than a millisecond. The one-time 
enrolment of the key then takes on the order of a second. 
Quantum-secure authentication does not require any secret 
information and is therefore invulnerable to adversaries 
characterizing the properties of the key (“skimming”). 
Hence, QSA provides a practical way of realizing 
unprecedentedly secure authentication of IDs, credit cards, 
biometrics [29] and communication partners in quantum 
cryptography. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3| Quantum-secure readout of an unclonable physical key (PUF), using challenge 
pulses with 230±40 photons distributed over 1100±200 modes. a, Real-time examples for the 
true key (blue line) and a false key (red line, offset for clarity). b, Measured number of 
photodetections in case of the true  key, a random  key (imitated by sending random 
challenges to the same  key), and for an optimal attack given S=4. The threshold is chosen 
such that the false positive and negative probabilities are approximately equally small 
assuming an optimal attack. c, Acceptance and rejection probabilities in case of the true  key, 
a random key and in case of an optimal digital emulation attack. d, Number of 
photodetections extrapolated to 10 repetitions: the false positive and false negative 
probabilities quickly decrease to order 0.01 %. 
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Appendix 
 
Shaping the challenge and response wavefronts 
 
Two halves (referred to as SLM1 and SLM2) of the same 
reflective Holoeye HEO 1080P phase-only spatial light 
modulator are used to shape challenge wavefronts and 
decode response wavefronts, respectively. We use 50x50 
segments, each consisting of 16x16 pixels, to shape 
challenge wavefronts. Since the used beams are cylindrical, 
the corners of the 50x50 segments area are not illuminated, 
so that we effectively use 2500π/4 = 1963 segments of 
SLM1. Each segment is set to a phase of either 0 or π, 
allowing a total of 21963 = 10591 different challenges, of 
which 1963 are orthogonal. This number is slightly larger 
than the number of modes that is supported by the sample 
area that we illuminate, which is experimentally verified to 
be 1100±200. The challenge is focused onto the PUF using 
a 0.95 NA 63x Zeiss microscope objective. The response is 
collected using the same objective and measured in 
130x130 segments using standard phase-shifting 
interferometry [30]. This data is used to find the phases of 
the response wavefront at the 130x130 corresponding 
segments with in total 800x800 pixels on SLM2. SLM2 is 
then set to flatten the phase of the response wavefront by 
adding the conjugate phase to the response wavefront.  
 
Cryptographic context 
 
In Table T1 an overview of important cryptographic 
methods is provided. Note that the overview is not limited 
to authentication methods.  
 
 
 
 
Method Purpose Technical Requirements Security Assumptions Status 
   Physical Mathematical  
BB84 [10] Key exchange Authenticated classical 
communication channel; 
single photons 
none none Experimentally 
demonstrated, 
commercially 
available 
SARG04 [31] Key exchange Authenticated classical 
communication channel; 
weak coherent pulses 
none none Commercially 
available, more 
practical than BB84 
Diffie-Hellman 
[32] 
Key exchange Authenticated classical 
communication channel 
Quantum computers are 
infeasible to build 
Discrete 
Logarithms are 
difficult to compute 
Widely used 
RSA [33] Public-key crypto. 
Encryption; 
signatures 
 Quantum computers are 
infeasible to build 
“RSA Assumption” 
~Factoring a 
product of two 
large primes is 
difficult 
Widely used 
McEliece [34] Public-key crypto. 
Encryption; 
signatures 
 none Decoding an 
unknown linear 
code is difficult 
Well studied; 
currently considered 
less practical than 
other asymmetric 
crypto 
Message Authen-
tication Codes 
(MACs) [35]  
Message 
authentication 
Short secret pre-shared 
key 
none none Widely used 
Mechanical key Authentication; 
access control 
Physical lock & key 
mechanism needed; key 
must be distributed first 
Inferring key from lock 
is difficult 
none Ancient, still widely 
used 
Quantum money 
[36, 37] 
Anti-counterfeiting Long-term storage and 
high fidelity initialization 
and readout of quantum 
memory 
none none Proposed; Very 
difficult and ex-
pensive with current 
technology 
Classical PUF 
authentication [1] 
Object authenti-
cation, hands-on 
Antispoofing detectors 
against emulation 
PUF is  
physically 
unclonable 
none Experimentally 
demonstrated 
QSA Object 
authentication, 
hands-off 
Fewer photons than 
modes 
Lossless im-
plementation of high-
dimensional arbitrary 
unitaries is infeasible 
none New; Proven 
unconditionally 
secure against digital 
emulation [38] 
 
Table T1. Overview of important cryptographic methods.  
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Unconditionally secure authentication methods have been 
proposed that use qubits as a key, e.g. quantum money and 
a number of methods based on quantum-entangled keys. 
These methods require quantum memory with long 
lifetimes that have not been achieved and are infeasible 
using current technology. Unconditionally secure classical 
authentication procedures, such as MACs (which are 
typically used in conjunction with QKD), are usually 
symmetric and require the distribution and secret storage of 
classical keys between every pair of parties that must be 
able to authenticate each other. Asymmetric classical 
protocols, such as RSA, are much more practical and are 
therefore widely used for establishing authentication, 
despite the fact that they are based on unproven 
mathematical assumptions and therefore not 
unconditionally secure. Besides that, also asymmetric 
protocols typically require secret storage of private keys. 
Classical authentication which uses a Physical Unclonable 
Function (PUF) as a key has the advantages that it is 
practically impossible to copy the key and that it is not 
based on mathematical assumptions. However, every 
verifier must possess and be able to store secret information 
about the physical key. If the information about the key 
leaks, the key can be emulated using digital devices 
rendering the authentication protocol insecure. This 
problem is solved by QSA.  
 
Security analysis 
 
An adversary who does not have the PUF may attempt 
several attack strategies. We will address them here and 
show why they fail. 
1) Blinding attacks. An additional detector which 
measures the total intensity outside the pinhole is sufficient 
to prevent false positive detections in case an adversary 
floods the system with light. In addition, flooding can be 
detected by including fake challenges, for which no photon 
detections are expected. The time needed for one repetition 
of the procedure is in practice limited only by the switching 
time of the SLM, on the order of 100 ms for the present 
SLM. Therefore there is ample room to randomly include 
fake challenges where (unknown to the adversary) no signal 
is expected. This also provides security against attacks that 
trigger the photodetector by non-optical means such as a 
beam of ionizing radiation. Note that the same requirements 
hold for QKD. A QKD implementation has successfully 
been attacked by blinding the detectors [39]. 
2) A “Digital Emulation Attack”, in which the adversary 
attempts to measure the challenge and then estimates the 
response. As shown in [14] for single photon states and in 
[26] for quadrature measurements, this is doomed to fail. A 
newer result [38] shows that when a challenge consists of 
𝑛 < 𝐾 quanta in the same state, our scheme is secure 
against all challenge-estimation attacks. A quantitative 
example shows what the adversary can hope to achieve: 
In our experiment the lower bound for the quantum security 
parameter S is 4. Assuming that the adversary has a perfect 
photon-counting or quadrature measuring camera, the 
expected squared inner product between the adversary’s 
best estimate and the correct challenge is equal to 1/(S+1) = 
1/5 [26]. He can therefore expect to obtain a number of 
photon clicks at the detector that is 1/5 times the expected 
number of clicks with the correct challenge. The expected 
number of photons for the correct challenge is 4.3, so the 
attacker will obtain on average 0.8 photon clicks, well 
below the acceptance threshold of 3.  
Experimentally we tested the scaling at the basis of this 
argument. We parameterize the challenge wavefronts by a 
K-dimensional complex vector C0. This C0 is chosen by the 
verifier to yield the maximum light power in the focus 
behind SLM2 given the presence of the true PUF and the 
setting of SLM2. Now assume C0 is replaced by another 
wavefront C1. We quantify the proximity of the challenge 
C1 to the original challenge C0 by the inner product 
10 CC ⋅  = ∑= ⋅Ki ii CC..1 ,1*,0 , where the sum runs over 
the mode index. The fraction F of the light energy in the 
focus was experimentally found to scale as F = 0.6 |
10 CC ⋅ |2, confirming the scaling explained in [26].  
3) Making an exact physical copy of the PUF. For our key 
this requires positioning millions of particles with the exact 
same high refractive index as zinc-oxide and with exactly 
the correct shapes at exactly the right positions on a 
nanometer scale. This is not possible with current 
technology and also not possible in the foreseeable future. 
To our knowledge no one even tried this. 
4) Making a passive optical device that emulates the 
PUF’s physical challenge-response behavior. 
Since the PUF only realizes a complex linear 
transformation, one would be tempted to think that it is 
straightforward to make a passive optical device which 
does the same optical transformation as the PUF. It is not. 
The crucial point is that the adversary cannot know which 
challenge to expect, and therefore can only succeed if his 
passive optical device produces the correct response for a 
large fraction of the challenge space. In other words, he 
will have to emulate a large fraction of the optical 
properties of the PUF into his optical device. This comes 
close to making a copy of the PUF. A three-dimensional 
random scattering medium with front surface area A 
contains much more random information than can be 
encoded in a random scattering surface of the same area A. 
For our sample parameters, a single diffraction-limited spot 
focused on the surface of the PUF gives rise to a speckle 
pattern with a Gaussian envelope with a Full Width at Half 
Maximum (FWHM) of approximately 5µm, containing 
about 102 speckles. When we illuminate the PUF with a 
random challenge, the illumination spot is much larger than 
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a diffraction-limited spot. The PUF is now seen to reflect a 
speckle pattern with a FWHM of about 15µm, containing 
the equivalent of about 103 speckles. The reflection matrix 
describing the PUF is nonlocal (i.e., non-diagonal in any 
representation) as it connects surface points that are 
spatially separated by up to 5 µm. It is therefore impossible 
to emulate the PUF with a single scattering surface (e.g., 
that of an SLM), which would have a local reflection 
matrix. 
An intriguing form of attack would be to make a PUF-
emulating hologram into which a large portion of the PUF’s 
reflection matrix is written. Because of the low index of 
refraction contrast of photorefractive materials, on the order 
of 0.02 to 0.1 [40], such a hologram must be significantly 
larger than the true PUF to obtain sufficient reflectivity. 
Therefore, this form of attack can be easily foiled using a 
light source with a coherence length of the order of 30 µm, 
on the order of the average path length photons travel in the 
PUF. The average optical path in the hologram is much 
longer than the coherence length so that no speckle pattern 
will form.  
Another intriguing form of attack would be by means of a 
PUF-emulating nanophotonic network. Since in principle 
every passive linear optical network can be emulated by a 
sufficiently complex network of, e.g., beam splitters [41], 
this is in theory possible. Work by, e.g., Miller et al. [42, 
43] shows the concepts needed to make such a network. 
However, an adversary who wants to emulate the PUF 
functionality needs to program a passive optical device with 
K modes and K2 connecting elements while keeping all the 
involved path lengths equal to within the coherence length.  
Despite the huge efforts already spent in making linear 
optical networks for linear optical quantum computing and 
quantum simulation, state of the art networks have at 
maximum on the order of 10 connected beam splitters [44] 
and losses of 0.2 dB per element for waveguide-based beam 
splitters [45]. Recently larger networks have been built 
[46], but they only work because of the high tolerance 
against phase errors possible in the functionality of the 
realized phased arrays, which does not apply for a PUF 
emulator. Alternative photonic-crystal-based networks 
could be smaller [47], but the corresponding losses are even 
higher. Hence, the extension to 106 connected nodes with 
overall losses of less than 10dB, extreme phase sensitivity 
and simultaneously keeping the differential path lengths to 
within 30 micrometer is still far out of reach of technology. 
If possible at all in future, it would require 106 optical 
elements each with a loss of less than 0.01 dB and a 
tremendous effort to emulate a single PUF. 
A note about the scaling: For an K-mode PUF, the 
adversary needs to make a passive optical device with K2 
connecting elements. In our demonstration we have used on 
the order of 103 modes, but increasing this to 105 seems 
entirely feasible with present technology, given the 
availability of megapixel SLMs. With the state-of-the-art 
beam splitters [45], the required network of in the order of 
1010 optical elements would have a loss of 20000dB and 
cover an area of the order of 1m2. 
5) A quantum computer can emulate our key only if it can 
perform arbitrary unitary operations on K-dimensional 
quantum states of light with low losses. The technologically 
most feasible way to do this seems to be through a tunable 
low-loss K-dimensional optical device. Such a device is at 
least as difficult to build as a passive low-loss K-
dimensional optical device. This is infeasible for the same 
arguments presented in point 4) [48]. 
6) Hybrid strategies that mix (complex) passive elements 
and measuring devices. In the proof of the security against 
challenge-estimation attacks [38] no assumptions are made 
about the basis in which the adversary measures the 
challenge. Even if the adversary can program an arbitrary 
linear transformation before the measurement, he cannot 
breach the QSA scheme by estimating the challenge. In fact 
it is always better for the adversary to use his linear 
transformation capabilities directly on the challenge state as 
in attack 4.  
 
Repetition for exponential security gain 
Fig. S1 shows the calculated probability of false-positive 
and false-negative decisions as a function of S and the 
number of repetitions, with the number of modes K kept 
constant. For each point in Fig. S1 the threshold was chosen 
in the minimum between the photon detection distributions 
obtained with the true PUF and the one calculated for the 
optimal challenge estimation attack. This leads to false 
positive and false negative probabilities that are 
approximately equally small. At a moderate S the 
probability of an erroneous decision is already of order 10-4 
after 10 repetitions. At high S it takes more repetitions to 
rule out incorrect decisions since high S (at fixed K) implies 
a low photon number n. Since the threshold can only be 
taken at an integer number of photons, one may notice 
some quantization steps. For larger numbers of repetitions 
the probability of an incorrect decision is reduced 
exponentially and can hence be made arbitrarily small.  
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Figure S1. Probability of a false positive (acceptance of a challenge estimation attack) and a false negative decision (rejection of a correct 
PUF) as a function of the security parameter S and the number of repetitions (rounds). The plot is made by varying n and choosing the 
optimal threshold, while keeping K = 1062. 
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